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Abstract 
This paper examines how social psychology textbooks represent Kurt Lewin and his 
contribution to social psychology. Many textbooks describe Lewin as the father of social 
psychology, using a conventional, passive voiced trope to do so. The rhetorical meaning of 
this trope is analysed to show that textbooks are invoking a collective memory, which 
closes down views of the past, rather than making a historical argument, which opens up 
the past for examination. This depiction of Lewin typically involves forgetting his critical 
views about statistics and experimentation. When textbooks cite Lewin’s famous motto 
“there is nothing as practical as a good theory”, they tend to ascribe it a special status. In 
doing so, they change its meaning subtly and treat it as a truth that needs no empirical 
validation. By their rhetoric, omissions and avoidance of historical sources, textbooks 
recreate Lewin as a mythic figure rather than a historical one. 
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Recently a number of analysts have been showing a critical interest in social psychology 
textbooks. Lubek (1993 and 2000) has argued that social psychology textbooks typically 
fulfil a conservative function by training students to accept the dominant assumptions of 
the discipline. Accordingly, studies have shown how textbooks promote the values of 
experimentalism, while marginalising or completely ignoring other perspectives (e.g. 
Billig, 2013, chapter seven; Lubek, 1993; MacMartin and Winston, 2000; Stam, Lubek and 
Radtke, 1998; Stam, Radtke and Lubek, 2000). As Gordon Allport (1954) realized many 
years ago, textbooks can reveal the changing patterns of social psychology over time. Thus, 
historical analyses of textbooks show how and when experimentalism became social 
psychology’s dominant trend (e.g. Danziger, 2000; MacMartin and Winston, 2000; Stam et 
al, 2000). As well as examining historical changes within textbooks, it is also possible to 
examine how textbooks depict the history of social psychology (Delouvée, Kalampalikis 
and Pétard, 2011; Kalampalikis, Delouvée and Pétard, 2006; Pétard, Kalampalikis and 
Delouvée, 2001). This topic is particularly interesting because it has been suggested that 
experimental psychologists and historians view human behaviour in opposing ways: 
experimental psychologists supposedly search for universal laws of behaviour, while 
historians analyse particular events; and experimentalists view historians as backward 
looking and unscientific, while seeing themselves as forward looking scientists (see inter 
alia, Danziger, 2000; Gergen, 2001; Tileagă and Byford, 2014).  
Pétard, et al (2001), studying trends in social psychology textbooks published in 
French between 1946 and 2001, show that there has been a decline in the proportional 
amount of space that textbooks allot to the history of their discipline. Nowadays, it is rare 
for major English language textbooks to devote an entire chapter to social psychology’s 
past. Some books include very brief sub-sections on history in their opening chapter: 
Taylor, Peplau and Sears (2006) have a one page sub-section while Crisp and Turner 
(2014) devote two pages to theirs. Other major textbooks have no sub-sections on the 
history of the discipline (e.g., Myers, 2008; Gilovich, Keltner and Nisbett, 2011; Bordens 
and Horowitz, 2014). Of course, such texts may refer to social psychology’s past, but they 
will do so in the context of discussing specific contemporary topics. 
In their corpus of French language textbooks Delouvée et al (2011) found that Kurt 
Lewin was one of the most cited historical social psychologists and that over time he has 
become increasingly identified as the father/founder of social psychology. This depiction 
of Lewin is, according to Delouvée et al (2011), somewhat paradoxical. The earlier post-
war textbooks discussed Lewin’s research at length but did not call him social 
psychology’s father/founder. By contrast, many of today’s textbooks identify Lewin as the 
father/founder but do not discuss his research.  
The present paper aims to investigate this paradox further, by exploring how 
English language textbooks today refer to Lewin. This means taking selected examples 
from textbooks and examining their meaning and rhetorical composition in detail. There 
are a number of reasons why the detailed analysis of selected examples is appropriate. If 
history represents what Stam et al (2000) call an area of ‘strain’, then claiming Lewin to be 
the discipline’s founder/father might avoid this strain while simplifying the discipline’s 
complex heritage which histories of social psychology stress  (Billig, 2008a; Danziger, 
2000; Farr, 1996; Jahoda, 2013; Moscovici and Marková, 2006; Pandora, 1997). It would 
also involve forgetting that Lewin strongly criticised the sorts of experimental and 
statistical analyses that are now standard within social psychology (Ash, 1998; Billig, in 
press; Danziger, 1994). Lewin (1938) advocated that psychologists should study concrete 
examples in depth, rather than collect and statistically analyse multiple examples of the 
same phenomenon. By analysing particular examples from the textbooks rather than 
compiling averaged trends from a wider corpus, the present study conforms in this small 
regard to Lewin’s own methodological preferences. 
It will be useful to follow a distinction which some specialists in memory studies, 
following the pioneering work of Maurice Halbwachs, make between history as an 
academic discipline and the collective memory of social groups (e.g., Halbwachs, 1992; 
Erll, 2011; Olick, 2007). History, it is said, opens up the past to debate while collective 
memory produces closed, simplified accounts, often designed to serve the present concerns 
of a group. Examples of textbooks mentioning Lewin and his place in social psychology’s 
past will be analysed to see whether the writers appeal to the works of historians or to the 
collective common sense of the discipline. This will involve noting discursive absences as 
well as presences because what is routinely forgotten can be as significant as what is 
remembered (Erll, 2011; Middleton and Brown, 2005). 
 
Science and Common Sense 
Current social psychology textbooks might not treat the history of their discipline as 
particularly important, but in their opening chapters they foreground the message that 
social psychology is a science.  They often contrast the science of social psychology with 
unscientific common sense (Billig, 2013). This contrast forms the background against 
which specific references to Lewin should be understood. 
It is easy to find examples of textbooks giving early prominence to the claim that 
social psychology is a science. On the second page of chapter one Sanderson (2010) 
describes social psychology as a “scientific study”, as do Bordens and Horowitz (2014), 
while Myers (2008) uses the same description on the third page.  Hogg and Vaughan 
(2011) include a description of social psychology as a “scientific investigation” in the 
opening sentence of their first chapter. Baron and Branscombe (2013) manage to convey 
the message even earlier: the title of their opening chapter is “Social psychology: the 
science of the social side of life”. Textbooks in the natural sciences tend not to emphasise 
their scientific credentials in this way; their readers are presumed to know that they are 
reading about a science (Billig, 2013).  
In claiming social psychology to be a science and comparing it with unscientific 
common sense, the textbooks are making value-laden judgements. Chapter one in 
Sanderson (2010) contains a section entitled “Is Social Psychology Really Just Common 
Sense?” The author emphatically answers in the negative.  Baron and Branscombe (2013) 
claim that we should be “suspicious of common sense”, which unlike social psychological 
research presents a “confusing and inconsistent picture of human behaviour” (pp. 14-5). 
Crisp and Turner (2014) suggest that we need social psychology to “provide scientific tests 
of what people believe is common sense, and to debunk misperceptions” (p. 2). According 
to Gilovich et al (2011), “stories and parables have attempted to explain human behaviour 
for millennia” but social psychologists “go beyond folk wisdom and try to establish a 
scientific basic for understanding human behaviour” (p. 7). 
In the history of European thought, the term “common sense” has had two principal 
meanings: the sensus communis or the commonly shared sense of a particular community 
or of ordinary people in general; and common sense as good sense, or le bon sens 
(Rosenfeld, 2011). When social psychology textbooks contrast scientific social psychology 
favourably with “common sense”, they are generally using the latter term to mean the 
commonly shared sense of ordinary people. The textbooks claim that it is not good sense to 
accept this common sense. Good sense should be based on scientific research into those 
topics about which ordinary people supposedly hold ill-informed, confused opinions.  
Since “folk wisdom” includes beliefs about the past, we can ask whether the 
textbooks also advocate replacing shared collective memories of the past with evidence-
based, historical knowledge; and whether this includes the common opinions which 
professional social psychologists might share about their discipline’s past. 
 
The common trope 
When textbooks describe Lewin as a/the father/founder of social psychology, they often 
use a particular trope. Hogg and Vaughan (2011) state: “Lewin is generally considered the 
father of experimental social psychology” (p. 21); later they suggest that Lewin is “often 
referred to as the father of experimental social psychology” (p. 43). Sanderson (2010), 
having listed several Gestalt psychologists, then writes: “One of these psychologists, Kurt 
Lewin, is often considered to be the founder of modern social psychology” (p. 9). Stainton-
Rogers (2007) uses similar wording: “Lewin is generally considered the ‘founding father’ 
of experimental social psychology” (p. 20). Not all textbooks use the “considered to be” 
trope. Gilovich et al (2011) directly identify Lewin as “the founder of modern social 
psychology” (p. 11), while Baron and Branscombe (2010, p. 103) and Aronson, Wilson 
and Akert (2010, p. 72) more cautiously describe Lewin as “one of the founders of modern 
social psychology” (without identifying who the other founders might be). And some 
textbooks do not mention Lewin at all (e.g., Crisp and Turner, 2014). 
The distinguishing feature of the trope is its indirectness, accomplished by using a 
verb such as “consider” in the passive voice. The trope can also be found in handbooks and 
research papers. Taylor (1998) writing in the fourth edition of the Handbook of social 
psychology states: “The father of modern social psychology is generally acknowledged to 
be Kurt Lewin” (p. 60). In Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis McGraw 
(2006) claims that Lewin “is widely recognized as the father of modern social psychology” 
(p. 133). Kaminski (2011, para.2) in Canadian Journal of Nursing Informatics uses the 
trope twice: Kurt Lewin “has been acknowledged as the ‘father of social change theories’” 
and Lewin “is also lauded as the originator of social psychology, action research, as well as 
organizational development.” Whether writers use “considered”, “acknowledged” or 
“lauded” there is the same indirectness: the authors do not identify who is doing the 
considering, acknowledging or lauding. 
Academic writers use the trope about other figures and other disciplines. For example, 
Skidelsky (2009) writes that Simmel “is now acknowledged...as a founding father of German 
sociology (p. 173). According to Elliott (2008), George Herbert Mead “is widely considered 
the founding father of a general tradition of theoretical thinking concerned with the self: 
symbolic interactionism” (p. 30). Pelly (2006) claims that Lester Ward, the first president of 
the American Sociological Association, “is known as ‘the Father of American Sociology’ 
(2006, p. 209).  
It is easy to see why academic writers might favour such indirectness for academics 
commonly hedge statements, thereby leaving themselves an escape route in the event of a 
challenge (Biber and Gray, 2010; Hyland, 2005 and 2009). Although the trope might be 
hedged it can convey a similar message to an unhedged assertion. Some writers, in fact, move 
between hedged trope and direct statement. Within the space of two pages Sanderson (2010) 
goes from claiming that “Kurt Lewin...is often considered the founder of social psychology” 
(p. 9) to the direct ascription: “Kurt Lewin, the founder of modern social psychology” (p. 11; 
see also Aronson et al, 2010, who use the direct ascription on p. 72 and the indirect trope on 
p. 461). This suggests that writers might be using the trope as a conventionally hedged way of 
conveying X to be the founder of Y.  
Academic textbooks may not contain as many hedged statements as research papers, 
but they still contain a higher proportion than most non-academic writing (Biber and Conrad, 
2009; Biber, Conrad and Cortes, 2004). One may conjecture that the further one gets from 
academic writing, the less likely one is to find the trope. Pelly (2006) might have hedged the 
claim about Lester Ward being the father of American sociology but there is no hedging on 
the sign erected in Bradford County, Pennsylvania, marking Ward’s birthplace: “Lester Frank 
Ward: Father of American Sociology” (Rafferty, 2003, p. 2).  
At this point, some readers might think that the use of the trope in social 
psychology textbooks has been adequately explained. The textbooks writers are merely 
using conventional academic wording to describe Kurt Lewin’s special status within social 
psychology. This is hardly surprising because textbook writers are themselves academics. 
However, that is not the end of the matter. As will be argued, this use of the trope in social 
psychology textbooks contains features that directly relate to the distinction between 
collective memory and history. 
 
The trope and common sense 
To understand the significance of the trope, it is necessary to examine what writers can 
avoid specifying by its use. Critical linguists have noted that the passive voice enables 
writers to be vague about who is performing actions (Billig, 2008b; Fowler, 1991; Fowler, 
Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979). Scientific writers favour the passive voice in the methods 
sections of papers, in order to convey that the identity of the researcher conducting the 
study was irrelevant to the obtained results (Biber and Conrad, 2009). When social 
scientists more generally use the passive voice to describe social actions, they can spare 
themselves the trouble of describing precisely who is acting and how they might be acting 
(Billig, 2008b and 2013). 
The trope may refer to people believing, considering, recognizing someone to be a 
disciplinary founder/father but by using the passive voice writers need not specify who 
those people are. If writers had used the active voice, then they would have needed to 
provide a grammatical subject to identify who was considering Lewin to be the 
founder/father of social psychology. Even when writers qualify the trope by adding 
‘generally’ or ‘often’, they avoid saying who may not agree with the judgment, nor most 
crucially why they might disagree. By this absence they are conveying the judgment to be 
universal or virtually universal. 
However, the judgment cannot be literally universal for the writers are not 
presuming that their readers already know about Lewin. They sometimes repeat the 
judgment. This would be doubly unnecessary, if they believed that Lewin’s founding of 
social psychology was part of general common sense. The writers are assuming that their 
student readers are not members of the community that considers Lewin to be the 
father/founder. Even if the writers implicitly associate themselves with the judgment of this 
unnamed community, they give no grammatical indication. For example, they do not write 
that “we consider Lewin to be our father/founder”, using the first person plural as Levine 
(2008) did in the introduction to Journeys in social psychology, a book which brought 
together a distinguished group of largely American, experimental social psychologists to 
reflect on the development of their discipline. Levine wrote that “we study the give and 
take between individuals and the environments that guide their behaviour, what our 
founding father Kurt Lewin called ‘the life space’” (p. ix). 
Nevertheless, the textbook writers manage to imply some sort of affiliation without 
using the first person. The group that considers Lewin to be social psychology’s 
founder/father is, by implication, a group that is competent to make such a judgment. It is 
not a group of bio-chemists, undergraduates or residents of Bradford County. The group is 
presumed to be professional social psychologists. By using the trope uncritically, the 
textbook writers are implying that their readers should accept this judgement. Since the 
textbook writers are themselves social psychologists, their position is effectively the same 
as Levine’s openly stated position: they might imply that Lewin is our founding father but 
by their grammar they avoid expressing open partiality. 
If we take note of a significant absence, we can see that the judgement contained 
within the trope is based on an assumed collective memory, not historical judgement. 
Smyth (2001) has shown that psychology textbooks are rich in references, especially when 
compared with textbooks in the natural sciences. When discussing the findings of empirical 
studies, social psychology textbooks cite sources, but when it comes to judgements about 
the discipline’s past, then referencing all but disappears. In stating that Lewin is (generally) 
considered to be the father/founder, textbook writers do not support the claim with 
references to empirical studies of social psychologists’ opinions about the father/founder of 
their discipline. Nor are there references to historical studies.  
Instead the judgment stands within a small oasis of reference-free prose. Because 
the judgement is not referenced as the judgment of historians, it is implicitly presented as 
the shared sense of the community that is being represented by the textbook. Thus, 
textbook writers convey that it is good sense to accept this commonly held judgment about 
the discipline’s past.  
 
Common sense simplifying history 
The common sense, which the trope tacitly assumes, is part of the disciplinary common 
sense of social psychology – or to be more precise the disciplinary common sense held by 
the sort of experimental social psychologists represented by Levine (2008). By considering 
Lewin to be the founder/father, the holders of this common sense assume Lewin to have 
been an experimentalist, producing the sort of work that anticipated the empirical 
investigations that have become common within mainstream social psychology. A number 
of omissions and simplifications suggest that this is a judgement of disciplinary common 
sense rather than disciplinary history. 
First, there are questions that textbooks tend not to pose: in what respect was Lewin 
the father/founder of (modern) social psychology and what did do to qualify for that title? 
The textbooks, especially those with historical sub-sections, often describe Triplett as 
having conducted the first experiment in social psychology in 1898. Gilovich et al (2011) 
use the passive trope: Triplett’s study is “widely regarded as social psychology’s first 
experiment” (p. 536), as if being “widely” held makes a belief more trustworthy. The first 
edition of Journeys in social psychology, which contained a narrower band of contributors 
than the second edition, grew out of a meeting to mark the centenary of Triplett’s 
experiment. However, studies into the origins of experimental social psychology throw 
doubt on whether Triplett’s study was actually the first social psychological experiment 
(Haines and Vaughan, 1979; Danziger, 2000). The issue here is not to identify the first 
experiment, but to note that textbook writers can identify Lewin as the founder/father of 
social psychology while also claiming a much earlier experiment to be the first in social 
psychology.  
Historians have no difficulty in explaining the apparent contradiction. Danziger 
(2000) argues that founding a discipline like social psychology involves much more than 
conducting the first experiment that later comes to be called social psychological. 
However, the textbook writers generally do not discuss exactly why Lewin might merit the 
title of founder/father. Rather unusually Stroebe, Hewstone and Jonas (2013) do mention 
the difficulty and suggest that Lewin influenced social psychology by inspiring his research 
students rather than by his own empirical work which is not widely cited today. 
Sometimes, the textbooks are somewhat vague about what they are attributing to Lewin. 
Gilovich et al (2011), having described Lewin as “the founder of modern social 
psychology” (p. 11), describe him on the following page as “a pioneer in social 
psychology” (p. 12).  The authors do not explain the difference between being “the 
founder” and being “a pioneer”. It is as if such historical niceties do not matter. Gilovich et 
al (2011) have a fifty-four page reference list, but their brief discussion of Lewin does not 
refer to a single history of social psychology. The fifty-four page reference list does not 
include the main histories of the discipline. Thus, the textbook directs students towards 
first hand reports of empirical studies in social psychology; but to understand the past, 
readers have to rely on collective memories within the disciplinary common sense that the 
textbook is transmitting. 
This collective memory is not always trustworthy. Gilovich et al (2011) describe 
Lewin as a “physicist before becoming a psychologist” (p. 11). This is inaccurate: Lewin 
studied philosophy as an undergraduate (Marrow, 1969). Hogg and Abrams (1988, p. 8) 
also wrongly ascribe a background in physics to Lewin (“the father of modern 
experimental social psychology”), while also wrongly describing Wundt (“the father of 
experimental psychology”) as having trained as a physicist; they do not cite any sources on 
Wundt’s or Lewin’s lives. Hogg and Abrams were using the examples of Lewin and 
Wundt as part of an argument that social psychology was scientific by virtue of its 
methods. If experimental psychology and experimental social psychology were founded by 
proper natural scientists, then this strengthens present claims of scientific status. The 
authors are in effect constructing a desired disciplinary memory to support present 
positions and they do so by overlooking historical studies. 
Most of the histories of modern social psychology stress that Lewin did not, and 
indeed could not, have single-handedly founded social psychology. Social psychology 
already existed as a sub-disciplinary entity in the United States before Lewin’s famous 
studies, as is evidenced by the first and second editions of the book Experimental social 
psychology (Murphy and Murphy, 1931; Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, 1937).  To make 
Lewin the founder/father is to diminish the roles of Floyd and Gordon Allport, whose 
contributions to founding the discipline are emphasised within historical studies (Danziger, 
2000; Farr, 1996; Moscovici and Marková, 2006; Pandora, 1997). In fact, Daniel Katz 
(1979) declared that “Floyd Allport was the father of experimental social psychology” (p. 
351).  
Those textbooks that identify Lewin as founder/father tend not to give much, if any, 
space to alternative views of social psychology or its history. Moreover, textbook writers 
tend not to draw attention to the gaps in Lewin’s legacy. Most have chapters outlining the 
research into attitudes. According to Hogg and Vaughan (2011) attitudes “remain a key, if 
sometimes controversial, part of social psychology” (p. 149). This textbook, like others, 
does not mention that the figure considered to be the father/founder of the discipline 
resisted using the key disciplinary terms of “attitude”, as Gordon Allport (1948) made clear 
in his generous obituary of Lewin. 
We can ask what else the collective memory of the discipline might be overlooking. 
The biggest simplification is the way that Lewin is recruited as if he were patron of current 
experimental ways of doing social psychology. The mainstream textbooks are filled with 
descriptions of experimental studies in which variables are tightly controlled in order to 
isolate specific effects. Hogg and Vaughan (2011) in their opening chapter write that social 
psychology “is largely experimental” because most social psychologists “would prefer to 
test hypotheses experimentally if at all possible” (p. 9). They then describe a hypothetical 
social psychology experiment. It is a tightly controlled study with twenty children 
randomly assigned to two conditions where they either watch a violent or a non-violent 
programme. All else is controlled. The problem is that this is just the sort of experimental 
investigation that Lewin explicitly criticised as ‘Aristotleian’ (Lewin, 1931/1999). He 
preferred to examine concrete, individual situations in which groups or individuals would 
organically develop new patterns of action over time (Lewin, 1938; see Billig, in press). 
In addition, the founder/father criticised the practice of running separate trials for 
each condition (i.e. ten children watching aggressive programmes and ten watching non-
aggressive ones) and then statistically comparing the averaged data from the conditions. 
Lewin strongly argued that statistics belonged to the Aristoteleian or pre-modern stage of 
science (Lewin, 1931/1999 and 1938). He aspired to a science in which mathematics 
especially geometry would be used for exploring qualitative, not quantitative, differences. 
From the textbooks one would not suspect that Lewin disapproved of the procedures that 
have now become standard. Gilovich et al (2011) write of the importance of statistical 
analyses: “We will not mention the concept of statistical significance again because all of 
the findings we report in this book are statistically significant” (p. 59). It is just as well that 
they do not discuss Lewin’s empirical studies. Curiously, Gilovich et al include Lewin’s 
1931 article criticising Aristotelian (statistical) methods in their reference list, but do not 
refer to it in the text. It is as if the memory of Lewin’s views has been textually repressed 
but returns as a bibliographic reference to haunt the disciplinary consciousness. However, 
few readers will notice the reference, detached from any connection with the text.  
Gilovich et al (2011) and other textbooks, which briefly pay tribute to the 
founder/father, do not refer to historians or other scholars who have outlined Lewin’s 
controversial views on science and who have pointed to the contradiction between those 
views and the methodological practices that have become standard in social psychology 
since the 1960s. If the trope, which writers use to accord Lewin the status of 
founder/father, implicitly assumes the sense of a community, then its collective memory is 
marked by simplification and omission. We can say that more is being communally 
forgotten about Lewin than is being communally remembered; and much of this forgetting 
is communally convenient, at least for those sharing the dominant intellectual position 
within the disciplinary community. 
 
Nothing as practical as a good theory 
To go further, we need to examine what the textbooks tend to remember about Lewin’s 
contribution to social psychology, given that a decreasing number of them quote his 
empirical studies (Delouvée et al, 2011). A good number of the textbooks, but by no means 
all, associate Lewin with the famous motto “there is nothing as/so practical as a good 
theory”. Baron and Branscombe (2013) in their only reference to Lewin write: “Kurt 
Lewin, one of the founders of modern social psychology, often remarked ‘There’s nothing 
as practical as a good theory’” (p. 103; see also Aronson et al, 2010, pp. 72-3 and p. 462; 
Myers, 2008, p. 17).  
Such textbooks tend to present the motto as occupying a special place within the 
disciplinary common sense. Aronson et al (2010) write: “Kurt Lewin (1951), one of the 
founders of social psychology, coined a phrase that has become a motto for the field: 
‘There is nothing so practical as a good theory’” (p. 72). In claiming that Lewin’s saying 
has become a motto for the field, Aronson et al are pointing to its special status among 
members of the disciplinary community. There are two additional signs that mark out the 
motto in the textbooks as being part of the disciplinary common sense. Both these signs are 
absences. 
Absence of reference. Unusually Aronson et al (2010) provide a referenced source 
for Lewin’s motto: his posthumously published book Field theory in the social science 
(1951/1999). Usually textbook writers do not provide a source for the motto. Some by their 
choice of wording, together with the absence of a published source, imply that the motto 
comes from Lewin’s spoken words. Baron and Branscombe, in the quotation already cited, 
write that Lewin “often remarked”. According to Myers (2008, p, 17), Lewin “declared” 
the motto; Hogg and Vaughan (2011, p. 29) claim that “Lewin is often quoted as saying 
‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’” (emphasis added). None of these 
descriptions suggest that the motto might be traced to a published academic text. In this 
way, textbook writers can present the motto as if it belongs to a disciplinary folk memory, 
as the spoken words of the father/founder that have been passed down generations of social 
psychologists. 
Aronson et al (2010) may have provided a published source for Lewin’s motto, but 
that does not make their description of the motto’s origins accurate. According to Aronson 
et al, Lewin is the originator of the motto: he “coined” the phrase. Lewin (1944, p.27) may 
have used the motto near the end of the article that was to become part of chapter seven in 
Field theory (1951/1999), but that was not the first time he used it in print. The previous 
year Lewin used it in a paper, and there he made clear that he had not coined the motto. He 
wrote: “A businessman once stated that ‘there is nothing as practical as a good theory’” 
(1943/1999, p. 336).  
Attributing the motto to a businessman alters the phrase, for it is by no means 
certain that a businessman (or businesswoman) would understand the terms “practical” and 
“good theory” in the same way as an academic might (Billig in press; Weick, 2003). The 
attribution implies that the saying, which supposedly has become the inspirational motto 
for social psychology, originates from outside the discipline - and from the sort of common 
sense which members of discipline are supposed to find unsatisfactory and which they 
collectively wish to replace with empirical evidence. Forgetting the businessman is linked 
to a wish. Taylor (1998), in a footnote to an article in Handbook of social psychology, 
quotes the words of Lewin (1943/1999), commenting that “students of social psychology 
may be chagrined to learn” that Lewin had not invented the phrase (p. 87n). Most 
textbooks protect their student readers from such chagrin. In her own textbook, Taylor 
neither mentions the motto nor cites the article in which Lewin attributes its origin to a 
businessman (Taylor et al, 2006). Professional social psychologists are also protected from 
feelings of disappointment. Lewin’s attribution of the motto to a businessman has been 
excised from the version which is commonly quoted. In consequence, Lewin’s 
businessman has either been collectively long forgotten or is now safely confined within a 
few easily overlooked footnotes. 
We do not have to rely on Lewin’s attribution of the motto to a businessman in 
order to know that he was not its originator.  He was not even the first to use the motto in 
the context of psychology. G. Stanley Hall, the first president of the American 
Psychological Association, had used it in his book Youth, published in 1906. Writing of 
the role of ideas in moral and religious education, Hall commented that “nothing is so 
practical as a good theory” (Hall, 1906, p. 331). Hall also used the motto later in his 
autobiography (Hall, 1923, p. 447). Significantly, Hall was an admirer of German 
intellectual culture, having studied in Germany and having attended lectures by Wundt and 
Helmholtz (see, for example, Hall, 1881). As Henderikus Stam (personal communication) 
has noted, the motto - es gibt nichts Praktischeres als eine gute Theorie – has a long and 
somewhat unclear German heritage, being attributed to various nineteenth century 
scientists and, most significantly, to Kant. It is more than probable that Lewin, as a student 
of German philosophy, would have come across the saying.  
To this day, German writers continue to attribute the aphorism to Kant, typically 
without citing a specific source: see, for instance Knischek’s book of philosophical 
quotations (2009, p. 207) and Krüger and Vogt’s (2007) introductory chapter to their edited 
book on theories of biological education. The textbooks in social psychology do not hint 
that the motto might have a Kantian origin. Those readers who go on to become 
professional social psychologists can still believe that the discipline’s supposed founder 
formulated the disciplinary motto. Even believing that the founder heard it spoken by a 
businessman would be preferable to accepting that the motto of their empirical discipline 
owes its origin to a non-empirical philosopher. 
Absence of evidence. The social psychology textbooks, which quote the motto, not 
only fail to point to the longer history of the motto, but they demonstrate another absence: 
they do not refer to any empirical evidence to support the motto’s truth. This is an 
interesting absence since that the textbooks position social psychology as a science that 
empirically tests common sense. Likewise, handbooks and research papers, which cite the 
motto, do not provide supporting evidence (e.g., Taylor, 1998).  It would not be difficult to 
design a study that operationalised good and bad theories and then tested whether 
practitioners tended to find good theories to be more practical for their purposes than bad 
ones. Given the many thousands of experiments that social psychologists have conducted 
over the years, one would suppose that any study empirically testing the motto (and, 
especially if finding supporting evidence) would have become widely cited. The absence of 
any referencing suggests that social psychologists have not seriously tested, let alone 
validated, their father’s/founder’s motto. Reber and Beckstead (2009) describe the motto “a 
foundational premise of applied social psychology” (p. 151). It is if the motto has been 
placed beyond validation. Had it had been tested and found wanting, then much more than 
a saying would have been jeopardised. 
When the textbooks quote the motto, they do not mention Lewin’s ideas about good 
and not so good scientific theories. By championing mathematical Galileian science over 
probabilistic Aristotelian science, Lewin (1931/1999) was in effect justifying his own  
mathematised field theory, which practitioners have not found to be particularly useful 
(Burnes and Cooke, 2013). As such, Lewin’s own impractical “good theory” hardly 
supports his motto. On the other hand, the non-mathematical theories of current social 
psychology, which narrowly concentrate on the connections between a few variables, are 
not the sort of theories that Lewin had in mind as good theories. He imagined that a good 
theory would provide an alternative to ordinary language and that it would be used to 
explore single concrete occurrences in detail.  
The resulting paradox should be clear. Social psychology textbooks justify their 
discipline by claiming that common sense needs the sort of empirical testing that social 
psychologists can provide. Yet the discipline has its own common sense beliefs, among 
which Lewin’s motto occupies an important place. The discipline’s members do not treat 
the motto as a hypothesis requiring validation. Its status is altogether different: it is a wise, 
absolute truth coming from the discipline’s founder.  
This can be seen in comments by Stroebe et al (2013) as they conclude their 
introductory chapter:  
 “Social psychology today is an exhilarating and thriving enterprise. Living up to 
Lewin’s motto that nothing is as practical as a good theory, social psychologists are 
applying the understanding they have gained from their study of fundamental 
cognitive, emotional and motivational processes to the solution of real-life 
problems” (p. 22) 
The tone is not that of neutral, scientific description but it resembles that of a CEO 
delivering an upbeat annual report on the “thriving enterprise” to shareholders. For the 
success of this rhetoric, it is vital that the motto, which the enterprise is said to be 
successfully fulfilling, is not presented as originating from an anonymous businessman, 
run-of-the-mill social psychologist or long dead philosopher. It is rhetorically much more 
powerful if the motto is seen to come from the founder of the thriving enterprise. 
The writers are claiming that social psychologists are validating the motto because 
they are applying their understanding to the solution of social problems. Here we can note 
two subtle but significant shifts of emphasis. First, the original motto pointed to the 
importance of “good theory”, rather than social psychological theory in general. Most 
current social psychological theories would, according to Lewin’s distinction between 
Galileian and Aristotelian theory, fail to count as good theories. In Stroebe et al’s use of the 
motto, the notion of “good theory” (and its implicit contrast with bad theory) slips away. It 
is not just social psychologists producing good theories that are living up to the motto: it is 
“social psychologists” in general, as a community.  
There is another shift which also upgrades the implied meaning of the motto: the 
shift from being practical to providing solutions. The original motto claimed that good 
theory was practical, but now social psychologists are said to be applying their 
understanding to the “solution” of (unspecified) social problems. Kassin, Fein and Markus 
(2011) are slightly more specific and slightly more qualified, when claiming that “built on 
the legacy of Kurt Lewin, social psychology contributes to the solution of numerous social 
problems, such as environmental degradation” (p. 14). 
As always, what is omitted can be as significant as what is mentioned. It is not just 
the absence of references: the writers do not identify which social psychological work is 
supposedly leading to the solution of social problems like environmental degradation. 
There is another absence: politics. It is implied that the problems will be solved when 
social psychological knowledge is applied. There is no sense that the problems might be 
political in origin and that they will require political solutions. There is certainly no 
suggestion that the understanding of social psychologists might also be, or even need to be, 
political. Instead, social psychology is presented as a neutral empirical science, producing 
an understanding which, if applied, will result in the solving of social problems. 
Some of the textbooks recruit Lewin in order to convey that social psychology is 
inherently beneficial to the world: that experimentation and theory making, even when 
apparently abstruse and non-useful, are in fact contributing to the general good. In doing 
so, they omit the critical element in Lewin’s use of the motto. When Lewin (1944) used the 
motto, he was criticising applied researchers who avoided theory and theorists who looked 
towards social problems with “highbrow aversion” (p. 27). Today’s textbooks tend to use 
the motto to suggest that theory and practice are naturally connected. Sanderson (2010) 
claims that the connection between theory and application is “inherent”: “Kurt Lewin, the 
founder of modern social psychology, saw the inherent connection between social 
psychological theory and application as one of its greatest strengths; ‘There is nothing so 
practical as a good theory’” (p. 11). Hogg and Vaughan (2011) use a different, but similar, 
adjective – “natural”. They write: “Much like Kurt Lewin’s view that there is nothing so 
practical as a good theory, our philosophy is that basic and applied research and theory are 
intertwined or best treated as intertwined: they are naturally interdependent” (p. 35). 
The adjectives “inherent” or “natural” put the matter beyond aspiration or empirical 
testing. The thriving existence of the discipline in itself validates the wise words of its 
founder. The circle is closed, but the meaning of the motto has been decisively altered. 
Moreover, the textbooks do not offer their student readers any way to check the present 
mythology about the discipline’s past that the textbooks are transmitting. 
 
 Conclusions 
The adjectives “natural” and “inherent”, as used by the textbook writers in the above 
examples, suggest that we might be observing that part of the disciplinary common sense 
that could be called disciplinary ideology. According to some theorists, ideology functions 
to make the contingent world of human actions appear natural and immutable, as if beyond 
politics and vested interest (Eagleton, 1991; Ricoeur, 1986; Billig, 1991). Claiming the link 
between “good” theory and practice to be “natural” implies that the link does not depend 
on particular social and political contexts, or that there might be social, political conditions 
in which second-rate and even untrue theories might be more likely to be used practically 
(Billig, in press). 
The critical discourse analyst Teun van Dijk (2009) writes that ideology refers to 
the shared fundamental, axiomatic beliefs of particular groups. Few social psychologists 
would challenge the quotations, which have been examined above, or would critically 
unpack the meanings of Lewin’s much quoted motto. As such, experimental social 
psychology, whose rationale is based on a scientific critique of common sense, would seem 
to possess its own disciplinary common sense, communal memories and even ideological 
assumptions.  
Kurt Lewin derived the distinction between Aristotelian and Galileian science from 
his teacher, the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, although he deliberately ignored Cassirer’s 
writings on psychology (Billig, in press). Cassirer (1953) argued that our human ability to 
create myths is integral to our capacity for language and, in consequence, even in the most 
scientific of times myth-making still retains a force. Cassirer’s ideas on myth may be 
generally ignored by social psychologists, but they are instantiated within those textbooks 
that herald Lewin as the discipline’s father/founder, while simplifying, even forgetting, his 
ideas. Such textbooks are re-creating Lewin as a mythic hero, not as a historical figure. 
Also, they treat his motto as if it were a magical phrase which, if uttered, will ward off 
disciplinary doubts.  
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